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Abstract: 
 
The article develops the thesis that the EU Commission borrowed 
some features from the open method of coordination (OMC) in or-
der to implement the 1997 reform of the fifth EU enlargement pol-
icy. Contrary to the thesis of enlargement conceived as a unilateral 
policy, I use tools of historical and sociological institutionalism to 
show the relative institutional impact of one of the main instruments 
of the 1998 pre-accession strategy – the PHARE institutional Twin-
nings – not only on candidate countries, but also on member states. 
As Twinnings might be regarded as a new instrument of external 
governance, their implementation also illustrate the limits of the use 
of the OMC in EU’s external relations.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The fifth European Union’s enlargement towards Central and East-
ern European Countries (CEEC) has often been described as an un-
precedented enlargement due to the various challenges it opened for 
member as well as candidate states. Since 1989, the Commission 
has been in charge of coordinating European assistance to CEEC, 
and has developed its own policy towards these countries with the 
PHARE programme (annex 1)
1. In 1997, the enlargement policy 
was reformulated to allow for the opening of accession negotiations 
with ten candidate countries
2. As a matter of fact, political negotia-
tions began in March 1998 with five CEEC (Estonia, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovenia), plus Cyprus, and in 1999 with 
five further CEEC (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania and Bul-
garia),  plus  Malta.  The  new  design  of  European  assistance  gave 
birth to three further instruments, PHARE/Twinning, ISPA (Instru-
ment for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession) and SAPARD (Spe-
cial  Assistance  Programme  for  Agriculture  and  Rural  Develop-
ment)
3, to help candidate states to enforce what has become the 
most prominent part of conditionality, the acquis communautaire
4. 
The reform, presented in the “Agenda 2000” of the Commission 
(CE  1997),  was  also  designed  to  address  the  numerous  critiques 
formulated  by  candidate  states,  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Court of Auditors on the centralised management of the PHARE 
                                                 
1   PHARE  stands  for  « Pologne-Hongrie,  Aide  à  la  Reconstruction  Economi-
que ». The programme was launched in July 1989 to support changes in these 
two countries. It was later extended to all CEEC. 
2   They acceded to the EU on the 1
st of May 2004, excepting Bulgaria and Ro-
mania. 
3   The three programmes concentrate exclusively on priorities for accession, as 
defined by the Council in the Accession Partnership for each candidate coun-
try. In 2000-2006, PHARE is providing some €11 billion of co-financing for 
institution building support through "twinning" and technical assistance and 
for investment support to help applicant countries in their efforts.
4   The Copenhagen Council of 1993 defined conditionality around three criteria: 
1) stable institutions (guarantee of democracy, rule of law, human right, mi-
nority rights) ; 2) functioning market economy and capacity to cope with com-
petitive pressures inside the EC ; 3) the ability to adopt the acquis; accepted 
aims of political, economic, and monetary union. (EC 1997). The Summit of 
Madrid in 1995 added that candidate states should have the administrative and 
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programme and on the extended use of private consulting compa-
nies as sources of expertise (Comité d’experts indépendants 1999). 
It also introduced a paradigm shift (Hall 1993; Kuhn 1970) as it 
intended to promote a more regulative role of the state in Eastern 
Europe:  it  was  recognised  that  previous  PHARE  projects  were 
mostly driven by neo-liberal ideas and did not insist on the institu-
tional capacity of the countries to implement reforms (RFAP 2001; 
Veirheijen 1998; SP 1997, 1999). This paradigm shift and the be-
ginning of accession negotiations might furthermore have opened a 
window of opportunity (Kingdon 1984; Keeler 1993)
5, which al-
lowed the Commission to introduce new methods in the enlarge-
ment policy and to extend its legitimacy in the field of cooperation 
policies in a time of criticism. As a matter of fact, this period led to 
the Commission’s crisis in 1999 (Georgakakis 2000; Nugent, Sau-
rugger 2002) and paved way for an encompassing reform of EU 
external  policies  between  1997  and  2001  (Tulmets  2003).  After 
Christopher Preston has warned in 1995 that the community method 
has  reached  its  limits  with  the  enlargement  to  the  East  (Preston 
1995), several authors have interpreted the events mentioned above 
as signs for the emergence of a new mode of governance. However, 
they proved some difficulty to identify this new method and simply 
called  it  “governance  by  enlargement”  (Dimitrova  2002;  Engert, 
Knobel, Schimmelfennig 2001). I will argue that the innovative part 
introduced by the 1997 reform of the enlargement policy in fact 
originates in the adaptation of a recent method of EU-governance
6, 
the open method of coordination (OMC). As the authors mentioned 
above mainly focus on institutional Twinning, I will stay on the 
same empirical ground to show this. The “institutional Twinnings” 
are part of the two main priorities launched with this reform – insti-
tution-building (30% of PHARE’s budget) and investments (70% of 
the budget) – and particularly aim at making available the expertise 
                                                 
5   On the concept applied to the reform of the EU external policy: Nugent N., 
Saurugger S. (2002). 
6   The literature on governance identifies two kinds of governance, a hierarchical 
and a non-hierarchical one. Hierarchical governance is attached to the notion 
of hierarchical control of power (coercion). Non-hierarchical modes of steer-
ing relate to flexible modes of action and policy management (benchmarking, 
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of member state practitioners to CEEC administrations
7 on a spe-
cific issue – administrative and judicial capacities – where the EU 
has developed no acquis so far. Twinning projects focus on four 
key areas: agriculture, the environment, finance, as well as justice 
and home affairs. In 1999, preparatory measures for the implemen-
tation of the structural funds were added as a topic. In the 1998-
2002 period, around 700 twinning projects – often involving more 
than one EU member state – were approved.  
 
The literature on the OMC already showed that this method was 
adapted to other EU policies than employment, social and economic 
ones, where it originates
8. This article starts with the idea that the 
OMC  was  also  introduced  in  1997  in  the  European  Union’s 
enlargement policy (identified as a specific foreign policy), albeit in 
a primitive form (mainly benchmarking), in order to integrate non-
member states. In particular, it argues that the 1997 reform had an 
impact on candidate states as well as on member states. Almost no 
scholars have defined the enlargement process in these terms yet. 
As authors of the emerging literature on “enlargement governance”
9 
have  focused  on  implementation  and  put  aside  the  programming 
side of this policy, they have so far emphasised the unilateral aspect 
of enlargement as a way of explaining the “Europeanisation” and 
“socialisation”  of  candidate  countries  (Vass  1993;  Grabbe  2003; 
Schimmelfennig 2002). It will be argued in this article that a top-
down understanding of “Europeanisation” or “socialisation” is too 
simplistic: first, it is not sure that coordination processes between 
member states’ national policies and the EU have performed the 
way they should have; second, it is not certain that candidate coun-
tries have complied to EU norms in a straightforward way: first one 
needs  to  question  the  existence  of  institutional  European  models 
                                                 
7 “The best way of [putting the basic structures into place] is to use civil servants 
from the Member States to provide advice and training to local civil servants”. 
EC (1999). 
8   The OMC in fact originates in multinational companies’ benchmarking prac-
tices and was first applied in the economic policy co-ordination. For more de-
tail on this, see for example Goetschy (1999).  
9   It might be criticised in the sense that it does not propose any definition of 
“enlargement governance” and often forgets to include non-state actors in the 
analysis. See Dakowska (2003) for a criticism of Dimitrova (2002). See also 
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and to identify some leeway left to these countries in the program-
ming  and  implementation  phases  of  assistance.  Therefore,  taking 
into account the impact of new enlargement procedures and rules on 
EU member states as well is a way of investigating the nature of 
this rather “mutually constitutive process” (Wessels 1996), which 
operates more in a horizontal than in a vertical way. This idea is 
close to what C. Radaelli calls “horizontal Europeanisation”. I will 
in fact look at the way non-hierarchical modes of steering (bench-
marking,  public-private  interaction),  while  “increasing  the  moral 
legitimacy of the rules and norms in question” (Risse 2003: 3,4), 
contribute to a process of institutional adaptation and mutual so-
cialisation
10.  
 
Building on this, one might ask if the introduction of OMC in the 
fifth enlargement policy proves more efficient than the community 
method. To the Commission’s point of view, the expectations at-
tached to this method are: a) to enhance consistency
11 in the EU 
enlargement  policy,  i.e.  in  the  coordination  of  EU  and  member 
states’ policies; b) to increase the candidate states’ compliance with 
EU norms; c) to nurture learning processes between member and 
candidate states through the transfer of knowledge from Western to 
Eastern Europe
12. In this article, I will check to what extend these 
expectations have been met in the framework of institutional Twin-
nings.  
 
The  accession  conditionality  defined  in  the  enlargement  policy 
might be seen as a policy frame
13 of a specific regime, which re-
                                                 
10 I thank an anonymous EPER reviewer for helping me to clarify my ideas on 
this.  
11 Consistency has been defined as “co-ordinated, coherent behaviour based on 
agreement among the Union and its Member States, where comparable and 
compatible methods are used in pursuit of a single objective and result in an 
uncontradictory (foreign) policy.” (Krenzler, Schneider 1997; see also Nuttal 
2001). 
12 This is what comes out of numerous interviews done at DG Enlargement be-
tween 2002 and 2004.  
13 S. Krasner (1991) defines a regime as “a set of implicit and explicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expecta-
tions converge in a given area of international relations”. M. Rein and D. Sch￿
￿ ￿n (1991, p. 263) define a “frame” as “a way of selecting, organizing, inter-Tulmets: Introduction of OMC in EU' s Enlargement Policy  59 
flects EU’s identity and applies to all future as well as old member 
states. The identified principles or values of the EU are “democ-
racy, the rule of law and market economy”, norms encompass the 
whole acquis communautaire. EU principles and norms are intro-
duced into national societies through rules, which may be formal 
(laws, procedures) or informal (technical knowledge, ways of do-
ing)
14. The Commission designed decision-making procedures for 
the political negotiations as well as assistance policies, which repre-
sent  prescriptions  for  behaviour.  I  will  especially  consider  new 
methods used by the Commission as means for change and sociali-
sation
15. The tools used for the analysis of change are borrowed 
from the sociological institutionalist perspective. Changes in norms 
may  be  identified  through  discourses  and  official  documents. 
Changes in organisations can be analysed from an external and/or 
internal point of view and identified through interviews and official 
reports. Changes in rules may be identified at the level of formal 
and informal rules by analysing the content of specific projects in 
sector-oriented fields. Nevertheless this approach will be completed 
by historical institutionalism in order to identify the real nature of 
change. When considering path dependence and cultural reasons, 
institutional change might be qualified as a limited one. These ap-
proaches  position  against  rational-choice  perspective  as  they  en-
hance the fact that actor’s interests are constructed by norms and 
values
16. 
 
                                                                                                               
preting, and making sense of a complex reality so as to provide guideposts for 
knowing,  analyzing,  persuading  and  acting.  A  frame  is  a  perspective  from 
which an amorphous, ill-defined problematic situation can be made sense of 
and acted upon”.  
14 On this distinction, see also D. North (1990: 47 and 37).  
15 The field of (international) socialisation has given rise to abundant literature. 
See for ex. Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990), Risse and Sikkink (1999), Checkel 
(2001), Alderson (2001). The literature on public policy prefers to speak of 
“learning processes”. P. Sabatier and E. Schlager (2000) distinguish a) learn-
ing on policy content, which is defined as the achievement of policy objec-
tives, from b) policy learning, focusing on the ways of finding resources for 
the purpose of maintaining, or ameliorating the organisational situation. This 
definition fits with my two variables, changes on norms and organisations.  
16 For more detail on this, see Hall and Taylor (1996).  Tulmets: Introduction of OMC in EU' s Enlargement Policy  60 
This article is divided into four parts: a first part presents the way 
the OMC was adapted to the EU enlargement and cooperation pol-
icy. A second part focuses on the impact of the launching of Twin-
ning on two member states, Germany and France, which are the two 
main European donor countries to CEEC, and its limits in terms of 
consistency  and  coordination.  A  third  part  details  the  impact  of 
Twinning  on  two  candidate  states  during  the  1997-2004  period, 
Estonia and Hungary, and the sometimes limited adaptation proc-
esses resulting from the use of the OMC in cooperation projects. 
Drawing on these conclusions, a fourth part explains how Twinning 
might be seen as an instrument of mutual socialisation between ad-
ministrative elites of member and candidate states. 
 
 
2.  The Introduction of the OMC into the European Enlarge-
ment Policy 
 
The 1997 reform of EU assistance, which the introduction of Twin-
ning belongs to, concentrated on two main points: on the formula-
tion  of  new  procedures  and  rules  inspired  by  the  OMC  opening 
ways  for  a  better  co-ordination  between  member  and  candidate 
states;  on  a  process  of  decentralisation/deconcentration of imple-
mentation activities. 
 
2.1  The OMC as a Source of Innovation: New Procedures and 
Rules in the Enlargement policy  
 
As  the  different  “Strategies  on  enlargement”  of  the  Commission 
state it (EC 2002c: 8), a new method for enlargement has developed 
with and after the Agenda 2000, building new constraints for candi-
date as well as member states’ actors involved in assistance poli-
cies. I argue that this method is strongly based on the open method 
of coordination (OMC).  
 
When drawing a parallel between the instruments developed for EU 
economic, monetary and social policies, one notices that the revised 
enlargement strategy presented at the European Council of Luxem-
burg on the 12th-13th of December 1997 has included almost all the 
characteristics of the OMC. A few weeks ago, the European Coun-
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« innovative method » for EU’s labour policy, as planed in the arti-
cle 128 of the Amsterdam Treaty. When comparing the conclusions 
of November and December 1997
17, and using the criteria defined 
by the academic literature on OMC (for ex. Trubek 2002, words in 
cursive), the result is following: 
 
(a) The enlargement policy defines overall European-wide objec-
tives, i.e. accession when the Copenhagen criteria are respected. (b) 
These objectives are defined in a national action plan, i.e. the Ac-
cession Partnership (AP), completed by the National Plan for the 
Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) elaborated by the accession coun-
tries. The NPAA includes an Institution-Building Plan for the key 
ministries, agencies and institutions responsible for adapting to and 
implementing the acquis in sectors identified by the AP (EC/DGIA, 
1998: 7). (c) The AP are multi-annual, covering the pre-accession 
period,  thus  providing  a  basis  for  the  annual  and  biannual  pro-
gramming of assistance to the CEEC. The management of PHARE 
projects is done by the PHARE management committee (represent-
ing  the  15  member  states)  on  the  basis  of  National  Programmes 
(financial programme for each CEEC). (d) Candidate states must 
consult social partners and civil society in order to elaborate sec-
toral  strategies  (regional  development  plan…).  (e)  The  AP,  the 
NPAA,  but  also  every  Twinning  project  define  benchmarks  that 
candidate states have to reach. Twinning was in particular created 
in order to foster the exchange of best practices in the field of ca-
pacity-building. (f) Progress is evaluated on the basis of the AP and 
along a detailed list of standards (common indicators) in the Com-
mission’s Regular Reports. All these instruments were a basis for 
official negotiations and the programming of assistance. 
 
Added to this, new procedures appeared with the 1997-98 reform, 
especially for the new institution-building instrument. A team of ten 
persons  was  concerned  with  the  reform  of  the  EU  assistance  to 
CEEC,  led  by  François  Lamoureux,  Deputy  Director  General  at 
DG1A of the Commission, and Catherine Day, Director of Direc-
                                                 
17 Conclusions of the European Council on Labour 20-21 Nov. 1997, Luxem-
burg ; Conclusions of the European Council of Luxemburg, 12-13 Dec. 1997. 
The Council of Luxemburg officially opened accession negotiations with can-
didate countries.  Tulmets: Introduction of OMC in EU' s Enlargement Policy  62 
tion B (Eastern and Central Europe) at the same DG. Claude Cor-
nuau, advisor at the French Court of Auditors who was known from 
the SIGMA services
18, was hired in 1998 by the Commission as an 
external expert to help shape the reform of EU institution-building 
assistance.  
 
Twinning procedures are as follows: administrations of candidate 
countries have to prepare project fiches with the help of the Com-
mission,  which  are  transmitted  to  the  National  Contact  Points 
(NCP) and to the relevant administrations of the member states offi-
cially registered on the Commission’s “List of mandated bodies”
19. 
These  administrations  prepare  proposals,  which  are  sent  to  the 
Commission and then to the candidate countries. Following this, the 
relevant proposals are presented by the experts themselves during 
meetings organised by the delegations of the Commission in the 
relevant beneficiary country, so that the future partners may appre-
ciate the quality of the expertise offered by the member states’ ex-
perts and make their choice. The delegations communicate the final 
choices of the candidate countries to the member states’ partners 
individually, with a copy to the member states’ NCP and to DG 
Enlargement.  The  letter  indicates  particularities,  spells  out  rights 
and responsibilities, and constitutes the green light to proceed with 
the drafting of a Covenant between the twins. DG Enlargement pub-
lishes a summary of all final selections of each candidate country in 
tabular  form,  once  the  selection  process  is  completed.  Twinning 
projects are carried out on the basis of two new main legal docu-
ments a general “Framework Agreement” between the Commission 
and each member state and a “Twinning Covenant” between the 
candidate country and the member state (EC 2002a: 21-25). Each 
covenant contains the benchmarks to be reached at the end of the 
project, i.e. the making of a law conform to a list of standards, the 
improvement of coordination processes between ministries, of con-
                                                 
18 SIGMA is an institution-building programme of the OECD for CEEC and NIS 
co-financed by the PHARE programme. 
19 “List of Mandated Bodies entitled to act in lieu of public administrations in the 
framework of twinning projects for the purpose of institution-building under 
PHARE and CARDS/TACIS”, latest update 29.04.2004. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/twinning/index.htm  Tulmets: Introduction of OMC in EU' s Enlargement Policy  63 
sultation  of  social  partners  and  civil  society  on  a  sectoral  pro-
gramme, etc.  
 
Figure 1 – Twinning’s Annual Budget and Number of Projects 
(1998-2002) 
  Contracted Amount  
(Mio EUR) 
Number of projects  Average Amount per 
project (Mio EUR) 
1998  76,8  103  0,75 
1999  118,7  122  0,97 
2000  145,8  146  1,00 
2001  132,0  131  1,01 
2002  163,4  191  0,86 
Total  636,7  693  0,92 
Source:  DG  Enlargement,  Twinning  coordination  team,  Statistics  Institution-
Building Twinning, 1
st April 2003.  
 
The methods used for the preparation, implementation and evalua-
tion of Twinning projects rely mainly on the OMC and management 
methods, in particular given the fact that projects should indicate 
benchmarks to be achieved. The OMC was also a source of inspira-
tion for projects related to a poor acquis, like in public service or in 
the fiscal and social sectors, or to a non-existing acquis, like for 
administrative and judicial capacities. Inspired by the past experi-
ence of the OECD, it encourages the exchange of good or best prac-
tices on administrative and institutional settings in all fields of EU 
activities. Therefore, Twinning represents a basis for the making of 
a “soft law” on institutional management of the acquis in all EU 
sectors. 
 
In order to make the new rules work, coordination structures were 
created between member/candidate states and the Commission. A 
network of National Contact Points (NCP) was established to work 
with the Commission: Each member state and each candidate coun-
try appointed a person to represent them, to liaise with their own 
administration and to ensure the flow of information throughout the 
network (EC/DGIA 1998: 9).  
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2.2  Deconcentration and Decentralisation 
 
Although  the  questions  of  decentralisation  and  deconcentration 
were  already  part  of  previous  attempts  of  PHARE  reforms,  they 
never reached the scope of the 1997 reform, which was, again, in-
spired by the OMC. The context was this time different, as acces-
sion negotiations were to begin in 1998 with the expectation of ac-
cession in 2004. There was a certain pressure resulting from the fact 
that candidate countries had to be ready to implement EU common 
policies.  Furthermore,  the  PHARE  programme  had  been  many 
times criticised on this issue (European Court of Auditors 1997). 
The objective of the 1997 reform was to accelerate pre-accession 
assistance delivery to cope with the pace of the negotiations while 
simultaneously developing a culture of sound financial management 
in the candidate countries (EC 2002c : 13). In conjunction with the 
transition  from  the  status  of  candidate  country  to  member  state, 
candidate countries had an obligation to ensure a parallel transition 
to a fully decentralised implementation system (EDIS), where the 
ex-ante control is waived and replaced by an ex-post control system. 
As far as deconcentration is concerned, one of the main critiques of 
the European Court of Auditors was the duplication of controls and 
decision-making  processes  between  the  Commission  in  Brussels 
and the delegations abroad (European Court of Auditors 1997). This 
sample of new rules and procedures addressed to candidate as well 
as member states encouraged actors involved in assistance policies 
to adapt in order to maintain their activities. As many responsibili-
ties were delocalised, growing contacts between member states and 
CEEC also drove to increasing mutual adaptations.  
 
 
3.   The Institutional Impact of Twinning on French and Ger-
man Assistance Policy 
 
The literature on enlargement did not so far notice that the new 
method, as used in the institutional Twinnings, aims at impacting on 
norms, organisations and rules of member states’ assistance policies 
in order to enhance consistency in EU’s policy to the East. The 
cases  of  France  and  Germany  are  particularly  interesting  for  the 
analysis  of  coordination  processes  between  the  Commission  and 
member  states,  as  they  represent  the  main  European  donors  to Tulmets: Introduction of OMC in EU' s Enlargement Policy  65 
CEEC, and have been particularly involved, like the UK, in the im-
plementation of Twinning projects (figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 – Member States’ Participation to Twinning Projects 
per Candidate Country (1998-2002) 
  A  B  D  D
K 
E  FI
N 
F  G
R 
IR
L 
I  NL  P  S  U
K 
BG  8    25  2  9    12  8  2  1  8    4  13 
CY        1  1      1             
CZ  7    30  4  9  2  16  2  5  6  14  1  3  27 
EE      12  5  1  14  5  2  4  1  5    8  6 
HU  11  1  22  6  11  5  16  2  1  4  10    8  13 
LV  1  1  9  4  3  5  3  1      2    8  6 
LT  3  2  17  12  4  10  7  1    3  3    16  6 
MT  1        2    1    2  3        6 
PL  8    43  13  20  6  41  2  3  10  20  1  9  30 
RO  4  1  23  4  20    32  9    15  11    5  14 
SK  13    22  2  8  3  14  7  2  7  8    6  8 
SI  13    18    12    5  1  2  2  4  1  6  6 
TR      3  1  2    1  2    2  1      2 
Total  69  5  224  54  102  45  153  38  21  54  86  3  73  137 
Source : EC/DG Enlargement, Twinning coordination team, Statistics Institution-
Building Twinning, 1
st April 2003.  
 
At the first call for proposals in 1998, Germany won about one third 
of  projects  (57  projects  from  103),  France  40  projects  and  the 
United Kingdom 23 (figure 3). To what extent did the introduction 
of  new  procedures  and  rules  by  the  Commission  and  the  use  of 
managerial methods open ways for institutional changes in member 
states’ cooperation policies? 
 
3.1  From the Promotion of National Norms to the Promotion of 
the Acquis 
 
Most member states developed their own assistance policy towards 
Central and Eastern Europe parallel to the PHARE programme, where 
they  mainly  promoted  national  norms.  Germany  for  example  pre-
sented its experience of social market economy, federalism and re-
unification through its “Transform programme” launched in 1992 with 
a budget of 300 mill. DM (150 mill. Euro) per year (Bundeskabinett 
1992, 1993).  Tulmets: Introduction of OMC in EU' s Enlargement Policy  66 
Figure 3 – Member States’ Participation to Twinning as Pro-
jects Leader and/or Partner (1998-2002) 
Year and  
no. of projects 
A  B  D  DK  E  FIN  F 
1998 
(103) 
no.  19  -  57  9  9  14  40 
  %  18%  -  55%  9%  9%  14%  39% 
1999 
(122) 
no.  14  2  38  12  15  7  32 
  %  11%  2  31%  10%  12%  6%  26% 
2000 
(146) 
no.  8  1  41  8  34  9  33 
  %  5%  1%  28%  5%  23%  6%  23% 
2001 
(131) 
no.  11  1  33  14  16  8  22 
  %  8%  1%  25%  11%  12%  6%  17% 
2002 
(191) 
no.  17  1  55  11  28  7  26 
  %  9%  1%  29%  6%  15%  4%  14% 
Total 
(693) 
no.  69  5  224  54  102  45  153 
  %  10,0%  0,7%  32,3%  7,8%  14,7%  6,5%  22,1% 
 
Year and  
no. of projects 
GR  IRL  I  NL  P  S  UK 
1998 
(103) 
no.  7  5  6  11  -  9  23 
  %  7%  5%  6%  11%  -  9%  22% 
1999 
(122) 
no.  9  3  13  19  2  27  27 
  %  7%  2%  11%  16%  2%  22%  22% 
2000 
(146) 
no.  3  4  12  13  -  16  30 
  %  2%  3%  8%  9%  -  11%  21% 
2001 
(131) 
no.  6  6  9  19  -  16  25 
  %  5%  5%  7%  15%  -  12%  19% 
2002 
(191) 
no.  13  3  14  24  1  5  32 
  %  7%  2%  7%  13%  1%  3%  17% 
Total 
(693) 
no.  38  21  54  86  3  73  137 
  %  5,5%  3,0%  7,8%  12,4%  0,4%  10,5%  19,8% 
Source : EC/DG Enlargement, Twinning coordination team, Statistics Institution-
Building Twinning, 1
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France  designed  assistance  projects  –  Official  priorities  of  these 
policies started moving towards the promotion of the acquis com-
munautaire  once  conditionality  entered  the  European  agenda  in 
1993. They definitely shifted their focus on the acquis as it was 
decided to open accession negotiations in 1998 and to focus on in-
stitution-building. In 2002, the French ministry of Foreign Affairs 
for example stated that  
 
“to the specific French objectives (…) aimed at increasing French influ-
ence, may be added those willing to support the pre-accession strategy: a 
main preoccupation is to make the institutions of those countries evolve 
and  to  confer  them  the  capacity  of  enforcing  the  acquis  communau-
taire”
20.  
 
The changes observed in official discourses somehow contributed 
to legitimate the paradigm shift in the EU enlargement policy, as 
well as the use of the OMC. They opened ways for the reform of the 
national assistance policy.  
 
3.2  An Organisational Impact: Reforms of the National Coordi-
nation of EU Cooperation Policies  
 
The organisational impact of Twinning is part of more general re-
forms that have been discussed in the field of national development 
policies since the 1980s. The specific context combining national 
agendas (change of political majority in France in 1997 and in Ger-
many in 1998) and European ones (the opening of accession nego-
tiations in 1998, negotiations on the EU budget for 2000-2006) may 
be  interpreted  as  a  large  opportunity  window  for  organisational 
changes at the national level. The introduction of the new Twinning 
instrument  was  mentioned  as  one  of  the  main  reasons  to  justify 
these changes. Impacts may be observed from an external as well as 
from an internal organisational point of view.  
 
                                                 
20 Web site of the French ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003: 
http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/Thema/dossier.asp?DOS=UE25  Tulmets: Introduction of OMC in EU' s Enlargement Policy  68 
National Coordination  
In France, external cooperation activities had so far mainly concen-
trated around two ministries: the ministry of Foreign Affairs as a 
co-ordination centre for all non-financial and non-military projects, 
and the ministry of Economy and Finance aggregating all financial 
assistance activities. After the 1998 reform initiated by the left-wing 
government of Lionel Jospin, these two ministries institutionalised 
new pools for the coordination of sector-oriented expertise in 2001. 
The ministries working in cooperation with the ministry of Foreign 
Affairs are now linked to the GIP FCI (Groupement d’Intérêt Gé-
néral France Coopération Internationale), those around the minis-
try of Economy and Finance are linked to the GIP ADETEF (Grou-
pement d’Intérêt Général Assistance au Développement des Tech-
nologies  Economiques  et  Financières).  Both  structures  took  the 
German GTZ (Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit) as an 
organisational  example  for  the  making  of  new  structures  able  to 
represent  French  interests  in  national  organisations  (EU,  World 
Bank, United Nations). Internal and public documents of these two 
organisations clearly indicate the major role played by Twinning 
projects as a motivation to restructure the French cooperation policy 
so that it may remain competitive; interviews also supported this 
explanation (ADETEF, 2002, p. 6; web site of the GIP FCI, 2003; 
interviews at both institutions, April 2003). 
 
The question of finding a National Contact Point (NCP) for Twin-
ning was not a complicated issue in the French case: it was inte-
grated at the SGCI (Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel 
pour les questions de coopération économique européenne), an in-
stitution set up in the 1950s for the co-ordination of ministerial ac-
tivities related to European questions. This institution was already 
responsible for communication activities between the French Per-
manent Representation in Brussels, on the one side, and the French 
ministries and their related agencies, on the other (Lequesne 1993). 
It  now  also  communicates  with  the  new  GIP  structures  and  the 
Commission. 
 
In  Germany,  reforms  happened  just  after  Gerhard  Schr￿ der  was 
elected as chancellor in September 1998. Almost all competences 
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omy (BMWi) to the ministry of Finance (BMF), led by Oskar La-
fontaine. The traditionally left-oriented ministry of Economic Co-
operation (BMZ) was also reinforced on many questions: the re-
sponsibility of the co-ordination of assistance activities to Central 
and Eastern Europe (Transform programme) was also transferred 
from the BMWi to the BMZ. In regard to these changes, one may 
not be surprised to learn that the German Twinning NCP was settled 
at the ministry of Finance, with a delegation office of the GTZ, the 
biggest German development agency related to the BMZ. The deci-
sion was of course contested by the BMWi and the Directorate gen-
eral for Europe of the ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2000, the list 
of contacts published at the end of the Transform programme’s an-
nual report was enlarged to all German Twinning correspondents in 
each federal ministry, most of these contacts being the same as in 
the Transform programme. German L￿nder have also been strongly 
involved in Twinning, as most of the federated state’s expertise on 
implementation of the acquis is located at the regional level. Almost 
40%  of  Twinning  projects  led  by  Germany  are  implemented  by 
Länder administrations.  
 
Internal Organisation 
As far as the internal organisation is concerned, many organisations, 
be they German or French, mention the necessity to import man-
agement techniques and to reorganise their internal functioning in 
order to remain competitive in the field of European cooperation 
activities. The German CDG (Carl-Duisberg-Gesellschaft) and the 
DSE (Deutsche Stiftung für internationale Entwicklung), for exam-
ple, decided to fusion in 2002 into the same structure, InWent (Ge-
sellschaft  für  Weiterbildung  und  gesellschaftliche  Entwicklung), 
and to work according to the model of a consulting company (inter-
view at InWent, December 2002). Interviews reveal that, as minis-
tries have a more and more political role, governmental agencies 
now do the administrative job of the ministries they are related to, 
and delegate the implementation of projects to smaller (mostly pri-
vate) agencies or companies. This also allows for the use of exper-
tise coming from interest groups. Twinning especially impacted on 
smaller sector-oriented structures, i.e. on national structures created 
within the framework of bilateral assistance programmes to CEEC 
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riculture. As far as consulting on law is concerned, the German IRZ 
Foundation (created in 1992) and the French association Acojuris 
(created in 1998 on the basis of “Arpèje”, born in the early 1990s) 
had to adapt to the new procedures and rules introduced by Twin-
ning in order to maintain their activities and to face the decline of 
national financial supports. They had to employ people on a full 
time basis to prepare Twinning proposals in order to have a chance 
to win some projects. All the costs engaged at the early stage (trips 
to the countries, preparation reports) represent large costs that most 
of the small organisations cannot afford for. Only structures partly 
financed  by  national budgets, which have gained experience and 
contacts  through  bilateral  projects  and  had  already  constituted  a 
database of experts, were able to answer to EU calls for proposals 
and to stay competitive. Smaller organisations not willing to intro-
duce management methods mostly rely on national resources and 
stick to low profile activities.  
 
3.3  An Impact on Informal Rules? The Use of National Public 
Expertise in the EU Enlargement Policy 
 
The decision to counterbalance the use of “private expertise” with 
projects carried out on the basis of “public expertise” is a main part 
of the strategy passionately defended by François Lamoureux as a 
way for the Commission to seek more legitimacy. As requested by 
regular OMC procedures, member states had to elaborate a database 
of expertise that did not necessarily exist before, as this expertise 
was often not yet integrated in European, i.e. external policies. 
 
The Definition of “Public Expertise” at the EU Level 
The introduction of Twinning into PHARE required to define what 
is “public expertise”. As this depends on the way it is organised at 
the national level, the Commission gave no precise definition, but 
elaborated procedures for providing public expertise. This defini-
tion through procedures is already present in the definition of exper-
tise within the PHARE programme:  
 
“Given the range of sectors and priorities targeted by the PHARE Pro-
gramme across all the partner countries, there is no typical expert, but 
there is instead a typical contract for the provision of the expertise needed 
in each individual case. Expertise is provided by international companies Tulmets: Introduction of OMC in EU' s Enlargement Policy  71 
and organisations, European federations, national institutes, universities, 
consultancies, NGOs and individuals. There is no particular advantage in 
being  large  or  small,  or  in  having  any  particular  corporate  format.” 
(EC/DG1A 1999 : 6).  
 
As far as public expertise is concerned, only administrative bodies 
are accepted. But after 2002, the Twinning manual stated that “the 
member states may propose, and the Commission may accept, that 
non-administrative bodies be mandated to implement Twinning pro-
jects according to the same conditions as if they were part of the 
administration” (EC 2002a : 22). This led to a large growth of the 
official “List of mandated bodies” established by DG Enlargement 
for Twinning. Although this instrument originally aimed at avoiding 
consultancy companies, private actors were progressively linked to 
Twinning projects in a direct or indirect way. 
 
Learning how to develop “public expertise” 
Most technical ministries of member states had only a limited inter-
national activity until the beginning of the 1990s, as their main role 
was to guarantee the implementation of Community law at the na-
tional level. International directories expanded greatly in the last 
years, especially through projects related to technical co-operation. 
EU  programmes,  especially  Twinning  projects,  helped  promote 
methods of the new public management, which require more con-
tact with private expertise and other societal bodies. Most of the 
ministries have institutionalised relationships with interest groups, 
research  centres  or  universities,  where  the  expertise  remains, 
through the creation of governmental agencies, which act as real 
mediators between the public and the private levels. In the field of 
justice  and  law  for  example,  the  members  of  the  above  quoted 
agencies Acojuris (France) and IRZ Foundation (Germany) are pro-
fessional federations of judges, attorneys, notaries, lawyers or uni-
versity professors. The same logic works in the field of agriculture, 
the environment or social questions: each sector has developed me-
diation institutions, mostly on the initiative of politicians or admin-
istrative directors, and sometimes on the basis of already existing 
organisations used in the field of development policy. Many civil 
servants interviewed in French as well as in German ministries ex-
plained that they indeed had to learn how to develop a specific ex-
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present this expertise to partners with different traditions and pro-
fessional cultures. They had to search for the competent persons on 
specific questions and sometimes did not know where to find them. 
For many national administrations, Twinning projects were a way 
to  evaluate  and  appreciate  their  own resources. Very often, civil 
servants sent proposals for projects in fields they believed to have a 
“comparative advantage” over other member states in the sense that 
they could argue that they had influenced the making of a specific 
EU-directive. But ministries sometimes noticed they could not pro-
vide for available experts on certain questions, either because these 
experts did now work in the private sectors (mostly for consulting 
companies) or because specific segments of the public sector had 
been privatised (this is often the case in the UK). In order to suc-
ceed  in  obtaining  some  “strategic”  projects  (for  political  or  eco-
nomic reasons), experts from the private sector would sometimes be 
hired for the duration of the project, opening a large, almost ethical 
debate within the framework of Twinning on the definition of pub-
lic service.  
 
In a way, the new procedures helped national administrations ex-
change knowledge on their everyday work, although exchange of 
information is not easy in a milieu where the culture of secrecy is 
the rule. The fact that Twinning projects can often be prepared and 
implemented by up to four member states also contributed to this 
exchange  of  national  experience.  Nevertheless,  coordination  in 
EU’s external policy did not especially improve. The project leader 
often encountered difficulties in the coordination of different sector-
oriented traditions to present a coherent solution to the receiver’s 
demand. Some projects were not brought to completion because of 
divergences or even rivalries between donors in the implementation 
phase. The Commission’s White Paper on Governance from 2001 
therefore mentions the possibility of introducing a similar instru-
ment between member states (EC 2001: 26). But the proposal was 
not taken seriously so far. In practice, Twinning has rather devel-
oped competition between EU member states on the transfer of na-
tional rules and techniques, a phenomenon that statistics regularly 
produced by the Commission (figures 2 and 3) contribute to main-
tain. As Twinning is also expected to have an impact on accession 
countries, how far may this impact be seen as a limited one? 
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4.  The  limited  Impact  of  Twinning  on  Accession  Countries: 
the Cases of Estonia and Hungary 
 
This part shows that the limited consistency of the EU policy and of 
the transferred norms has produced a limited “Europeanisation” or 
“socialisation” of candidate states. Even if the general framework of 
enlargement may be considered as a unilateral process, i.e. that can-
didate states have to adopt the founding norms of the EU, so do 
member states on an everyday basis and they are free to chose the 
way to do so. As Twinning experts look at the way candidate states 
adopt the acquis on an everyday basis, Twinning is perceived as 
one of the most politicised instruments of European assistance. But, 
at times, candidate states also had a certain leeway at various levels 
of the enlargement policy and a capacity to interpret rules and deci-
sions, as the implementation of Twinning projects shows (examples 
of projects in annex 2). Although new procedures and rules intro-
duced  with  the 1997 reform and implemented through the OMC 
aimed at impacting on CEEC’s organisations, norms and rules in a 
more effective and accession-oriented manner, candidate states also 
have learned ways of adding flexibility to this process. 
 
4.1  Impact on the Management of Assistance: Constraints and 
Leeway 
 
Twinning projects first helped to improve the national co-ordination 
of foreign assistance. After 2000, candidate countries had to intro-
duce the EDIS process (decentralised implementation system) and 
establish “High level working groups” to supervise and monitor the 
transition to this process
21. Thus the following structures have been 
required in each candidate country for the implementation of the 
PHARE programme (EC 1998 : 15; EC 2002c : 13, 14): 1) a “na-
tional fund” located within the ministry of Finance, which adminis-
ters  the  funds  allocated.;  2)  a  number  of  implementing  agencies 
through  which  the  PHARE  programme  is  implemented  in  each 
country; and 3) a Central Finance and Contracting Units (CFCU) 
                                                 
21 On  this  point,  the  Commission followed recommendations of the European 
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set up to carry out the tendering and contracting of specific pro-
grammes. 
 
The coordination of foreign assistance has often been a source of 
political debates on the distribution of power among CEEC national 
administrations. In Estonia, for example, this competency has been 
debated since 1993 between the State Chancellery (i.e. the Secre-
tariat of the European Union), the ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the ministry of Finance
22. The implementation of the 1997 reform, 
especially the requirements of the EDIS process, gave way to a sort 
of organisational harmonisation: the coordination responsibility was 
officially given to the ministry of Finance in most CEEC. As the 
implementation of the EDIS system still encounters many difficul-
ties in CEEC, Twinning projects keep on helping for the improve-
ment of management systems (etc) in the new member states.  
 
Twinning has especially had an impact on CEEC sector-oriented 
institutions, i.e. organisations and rules (Grabbe 2002; Dimitrova 
2002). Organisational reforms may be seen as imposed from Brus-
sels and they support the interpretation of enlargement as a unilat-
eral process. But other procedures of enlargement, like the ones of 
the Twinning instrument, introduced a considerable leeway for can-
didate countries for example in the selection of cooperation partners 
and of administrative or sector-oriented “models”. As a matter of 
fact, all proposals must be presented by the project leaders and PAA 
during  a  one-day  Twinning  meeting in the capital of the CEEC. 
Participants on the CEEC side are the persons concerned with the 
project  (ministry  and  sector-related  agencies).  Each  delegation  is 
composed of two to five persons. The CEEC representatives listen 
to the presentation of all proposals
23, which they carefully evaluate 
taking into account the previous experience of the experts on the 
                                                 
22 Estonian  ministry  of  Finance,  « Conception  of  Foreign  Assistance  (General 
Guidelines) », Approved by the Government of Estonia, May 28, 1993. (Un-
authorized translation, not published). Revised version: Regulation Nr 458, 29 
December 2000. 
23 Proposals generally have to be written in English and presented in English. A 
strong debate emerged on that point at the PHARE Committee as the German 
and French representatives were against this rule. French representatives even 
used the technique of the “empty chair” and did not come to some Commit-
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technical aspects and on international cooperation projects, they pay 
attention to their ability to express themselves in English and to 
their openness to find solutions adapted to local traditions. When 
the evaluation is positive, CEEC representatives often stress their 
interest for a “model”, and also the will not to retake it entirely: 
“(…)  the  involvement  of  experts  from  other  member  states  who 
have  introduced  already  the  integrated  environmental  permitting 
would be very useful because we should not consider the German 
system the only one or the ideal one”. Presentations are often addi-
tionally appreciated with “grades” on the basis of an “evaluation 
matrix”
24.  For  Renaldo  M￿ndmets,  co-ordinator  of  the  PHARE 
programme at the Estonian ministry of Finance, this procedure may 
be compared with a real “beauty contest” (interview CFCU, Tallinn, 
Sept. 2002). The presentation part is followed by a wrap-up meeting 
where the strong and weak sides of each of the proposals are dis-
cussed with the CEEC authority. The proposals’ presentations are 
summarised by the delegation of the Commission and sent to DG 
Enlargement, as well as the final decisions and the evaluations done 
by the CEEC representatives two weeks later. Member states are 
individually informed by the Commission of the CEEC’s final deci-
sion in order to prepare the covenants. Decisions are therefore often 
made on a strategic basis, depending on the EU countries CEECs 
want to develop partnerships with, but also on the basis of less ra-
tional reasons. It may be noticed that Estonia very often selects at 
least one country of the EU Northern co-operation for Twinning 
projects  (figures  2  and  3)  “because  of  its  growing  Scandinavian 
identity” (interviews Tallinn, 2002). 
 
                                                 
24 In this matrix, CEEC representatives evaluate for example a) the Twinning 
proposal (demonstration of understanding the problems and issues, compara-
tive advantage and extra services…), b) the oral presentation (general quality 
of presentation, response to technical questions…), c) the Pre-Accession Ad-
viser (professional experience relevant to the Twinning assignment, language 
skills, knowledge on the CEEC country, personality…), d) the proposed short 
term experts (scope and justification of the use of this expert…), e) qualifica-
tions of the Project Leader, f) the Twinning institution (profile and profes-
sional level, international activity and contacts, content and quality of pro-
posed support…), g) the tendering country (status of national experience, har-
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In general, Twinning projects have two main aims: help prepare the 
legal approximation in a given sector or chapter of the acquis, and 
help implement it. Very often, the completion of the first part is a 
strong argument used by the CEEC ministerial staff in charge of the 
political negotiations to show they have accomplished the formal 
part of the requirements, so that negotiations for the related chapter 
may be closed. Transitional periods may then be negotiated on the 
implementation part. In this sense, enlargement is not a fully unilat-
eral process, as CEEC partners are able to express their priorities 
within this framework in many ways: 
- by using assistance as a resource and as a way to add flexibility to 
political negotiations;  
- by choosing the member states’ partners and experts they want to 
work with; 
- by choosing to accept or not the proposed legislative and technical 
solutions for the transposition of directives into national law. 
 
As Wade Jacoby (2001 : 187) states, “since blueprints can be a tool 
of highly ideological actors, they can be countered with other blue-
prints, and their use can create many openings for political strife 
during implementation”. This partly recalls appreciations done on 
the national implementation of the OMC in internal policies, which 
have also highlighted the difficulties to merge European acquis and 
institutional models for implementation. 
 
4.2  The Absence of a European Institutional Model: Which Im-
pact on Sector-Oriented Organisations and Rules? 
 
Twinning project’s quarterly reports often mention two main objec-
tives that both sides have to achieve through their common work: 
the preparation of a national law conformed to the acquis by organ-
ising  cooperation  between  organisations  of  a  same  sector  and of 
close related sectors; the implementation of the law through training 
activities and elaboration of technical solutions. Twinning projects 
concern all negotiated chapters of the acquis. However, each CEEC 
has defined priority areas on the basis of the Accession Partnership. 
Hungary, for example, defined seven areas: further integration of 
the Roma minority, agriculture, the environment, border manage-
ment,  social  affairs, the judicial sector, and social and economic 
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Furthermore,  there  is  no  strict  European  harmonised  institutional 
model for the implementation of the acquis. When the sectors men-
tioned are linked to European common policies, the projects focus 
on adaptation and implementation of specific directives. When pro-
jects are linked to the political criteria of conditionality and to the 
EU’s third pillar (minority rights, justice and home affairs), refer-
ences are larger and connected to other European norms integrated 
to the functioning of the EU, like the OSCE or Schengen agree-
ments. The large project on “law approximation in environmental 
‘acquis communautaire’ between Hungary and France, with part-
ners from Austria, Finland and Germany” (2001) for example fo-
cused on four directives and one Council regulation related to the 
question of waste, on two directives and one regulation on chemical 
safety, two directives and a Commission decision on the question of 
air quality, two directives on water protection, and one directive 
related to industrial risk. Each project partner was responsible for 
the legislative adaptation and implementation in one of the five top-
ics, the French partner being the supervisor of the whole. Experts 
involved in the project mostly came from implementing agencies or 
specialised consulting companies working on French, Finnish, Aus-
trian or German adaptation to these directives. They all presented 
national  solutions  found  for  the  directives’  transposition  and  the 
informal rules developed for their implementation. In the environ-
mental sector, Hungary has therefore developed its own adaptation 
process to community law on the basis of four different traditions 
and more, as an additional Twinning project was implemented with 
Belgium and the UK in the field of waste management. Annex 2 
gives a sample of projects driven in Estonia and Hungary in the 
environmental and social sectors, and justice and home affairs and 
shows that there is rarely only one member state’s “model” pre-
sented.  
 
Since  most  projects  have  been  structured  per  domain  along  the 
chapters defined in the negotiation process, inter-institutional coor-
dination was often seen by the accession countries as a second order 
priority or was simply postponed to the implementation part of a 
Twinning project. As a law proposal can give rise to various inter-
pretations from different ministries, project leaders and PAA’s re-
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nation around a specific question in order to enhance communica-
tion between ministries. They had to learn on their own the best 
ways to develop such structures, i.e. to identify the relevant organi-
sations and to find a way to avoid competition between them. Many 
quarterly  reports  mention  the  attempts  to  develop  cross-sectoral 
coordination, in order to prepare a coherent law and elaborate tech-
nical solutions for its implementation. But they also highlight the 
implementation difficulties of such reforms as there is no specific 
European model on this.  
 
If one wishes to state the impact of conditionality and of the use of 
the open method of coordination on candidate states, it is important 
to stress the lack of specific convergence of solutions found for the 
transposition of directives into national law. The official presenta-
tion of project proposals by member states gives candidate states 
the opportunity to select the partners they want to work with, and 
the institutional models they want to take as examples and to adapt 
to  their  national  context.  In  the  environmental  field,  the  Habitat 
Directive is for example adapted in a different way in Estonia than 
in Hungary, because of different institutional traditions, and also 
because  of  a  different  bio-diversity  (interview  Umweltbundesamt 
Berlin, April 2002). The same logic applies to the agricultural, judi-
cial and social fields. Quarterly reports also state that recommenda-
tions  on  law  proposals  are  not  always  considered  by  the  CEEC 
partners, who prefer to implement policies and create new organisa-
tions on the basis of traditions and past activities. In this sense, the 
literature on the role of legacies of the past and path dependency 
(Stark 1992) might further explain the success and failure of Twin-
ning projects. This point is also taken into account by the literature 
on learning processes. 
 
 
5.   Mutual  Learning  Between  Member  States  and  Accession 
Countries 
 
Learning processes between member states’ and candidate states’ 
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learning processes happen is different from one policy to another
25: 
when the policy acquis is strongly developed, like for agriculture or 
the  environment,  projects  usually  focus  on  a  set  of  directives 
(mostly  framework  directives).  Member  states’  representatives 
therefore present the practical and technical solutions they adopted 
for the transposition of the directive(s) in their national law. When 
the policy acquis is weak, like in the fields of administrative capaci-
ties, education or social questions, member states tend to present 
sector-oriented policies on the basis of national laws. As the Com-
mission has less means of control, member states may have more 
leeway to influence these transformation processes of CEEC. In this 
sense, the use of the open method of coordination made out of the 
EU-enlargement  a  “European  multi-bilateral  policy”  (Petiteville 
2001). While the Commission expected that candidate states would 
learn from member states, tolls of historical institutionalism help to 
identify the limits of institutional changes. A sociological look on 
administrative  elites  shows  that  mutual  learning  processes  take 
place on an everyday basis. 
 
5.1  The Limits of Institutional Changes: Individual and Struc-
tural Reasons 
 
As Twinning is a young instrument in PHARE’s history, and as 
many projects continue to be implemented, it is rather difficult to 
offer  an  evaluation  of  its  precise  impact.  Furthermore,  only  few 
independent  evaluations  and  analysis  have  been  carried  out  and 
published so far (Papadimitriou, Phinnemore 2003) apart from offi-
cial evaluations (Birker et al 2000; EC 2003; European Court of 
Auditors 2003). Like an evaluation of the Commission mentions,  
 
“the institution-building projects made extensive use of learning by train-
ing and learning by doing [in order to] change administrative cultures”. 
“The instruments generally targeted civil servants or professionals in the 
public sector, in relation to the specific reforms to be achieved by the 
projects” (EC 2003 : 141).  
                                                 
25 Like an evaluation of the Commission states, “Twinning has been especially 
effective when the recipient country had to adapt to part of the acquis that was 
highly EU-specific or technical. In other areas, twinning and technical assis-
tance are alternative options that have sometimes performed well and some-
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Some projects could not achieve generic impact for the following 
reasons: (a) a number of purely investment projects had no adminis-
trative  impact;  (b)  some  institution-building  projects  were  100% 
devoted to technical issues and did not help introduce any changes 
in the public management; (c) some projects had generic impacts on 
targeted civil servants but these impacts have not been sustainable 
because of excessive staff turn over. 
 
The large turn-over in CEEC administrations, mostly because part-
ners change for the more lucrative private sector, is indeed a major 
problem for the implementation and sustainability of Twinning, as 
is often underlined by the PHARE Regular Reports. Civil servants 
are being trained on very technical questions, like for example on 
the preparation for Structural Funds, but leave before the process is 
over,  “causing  a  loss  of  institutional  memory  about  Structural 
Funds programming” (EC 2003 : 144). 
 
CEEC partners are on their part critical of certain points of the in-
strument: for CEECs, Twinning is not as flexible as technical assis-
tance, since they cannot send back PAAs as they could with private 
consultants when they did not do a good job (interviews in Tallinn 
and Budapest, 2002, 2003). PAA’s salaries are shocking, as they 
sometimes exceed what CEEC department directors are paid, but 
“there is no other way to attract them here for a longer time so that 
they transmit their knowledge” (interview at the Estonian ministry 
of Justice, Sept. 2002). And experts are not always aware of the 
country’s traditions and actual needs. Lots of them had the feeling 
“to be a spy” especially in the first Twinning projects, as CEEC 
administrations did not welcome these experts in a nice way (some 
PAAs had to wait for three months to have an office, computer, 
telephone, etc…) and often did not give information related to the 
project (interview with one of the first PAAs in 1998, Brussels, DG 
Regio, April 2003). In fact, the success of a project partly depends 
on the personality and faculty of adaptation of the PAAs and ex-
perts  from  member  states.  Critical  factors  may  be  summed-up 
around  the  advisor’s  experience  with  international  aid,  his/her 
knowledge of the administrative culture and political context of the 
accession  countries,  his/her  management  skills  and  his/her  pro-
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Twinning partners tend to keep in touch through e-mails and phone 
calls, which is rarely the case with classical technical assistance. 
For  the  Commission,  this  has  positive  consequences  in  terms  of 
sustainability.  
 
A  general  evaluation  suggests  that  the  Twinning  instrument  has 
been weaker in reforming organisations in CEEC along an almost 
non-existing “European model” than in transferring know-how to 
these countries. For the Commission, this is rather due to a combi-
nation of shortcomings on both the delivery side (e.g. lack of ex-
perience  with  international  projects  and  thereby  lack  of  change 
management skills), and the recipient side (e.g. lack of demand and 
commitment) (EC 2003).  
 
5.2  A Reciprocal Socialisation on Site 
 
It is also difficult to make a precise evaluation of specific projects, 
as the only documents accessible to the researcher are Twinning’s 
quarterly reports, which most of the time emphasise the positive 
elements of the projects. Furthermore, it is not always easy to inter-
view the different people involved in a project for a lack of time or 
availability, especially after the project has been implemented. But 
most PAAs and CEEC partners met in Estonia and Hungary have 
insisted on the common learning process brought about by the pro-
jects. Some PAAs even mentioned that the solutions elaborated in 
candidate countries for the implementation of a specific directive 
could be useful to solve some problems on the same issue in their 
own  country.  In  this  sense,  knowledge  has  become  a  source  of 
power for both sides (Haas 1992). This learning part of Twinning is 
often underlined in quarterly reports:  
 
“looking back, the twinning exercise seems clearly a useful and original 
tool for cooperation toward EU accession of the candidate countries. It 
contents valuable exchange of experiences, methodology and information 
on the approximation of the acquis communautaire. Member state experts 
fully  appreciated  the  quality  of  the  confident  relation  established  with 
their partners, the real discussion to overtake the task and effort to fulfil 
the  expected  results”  (Quarterly  report,  archive  of  the  Commission, 
2001).  
 Tulmets: Introduction of OMC in EU' s Enlargement Policy  82 
It is nevertheless important to stress the fact that the integration of 
project leaders, PAAs and experts in CEEC organisations required 
specific skills apart from the technical ones. Both sides had to adapt 
to a way of working inspired by the OMC, which is totally different 
from classical technical assistance. Most PAAs stated that they have 
learned a lot about CEEC’s administrative functioning and hoped 
this  knowledge  would  help  both  sides  to  prepare  for  future  co-
operation inside the EU. Long lasting projects, although very bu-
reaucratic, were a framework for a common understanding of tech-
nical  questions.  Many  examples  show  that  adaptation  processes 
were not always easy, as they first required a common language, 
then a lot of time, patience, psychology, curiosity for the culture 
and traditions of the other, and the will to work together. These 
skills are therefore crucial when the exchange of rules is at stake, 
and may sometimes open ways to long lasting political and eco-
nomic  cooperation.  As  a  conclusion,  one  may  state  that  mutual 
learning  and  socialisation  processes  mainly  took  place  between 
partners from member states and candidate countries on the way to 
implement the acquis, i.e. on informal rules embedded in national 
sector-oriented traditions.  
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Contrary  to  a  growing  literature  stating  that  the  EU-enlargement 
policy after 1997 represents an absolutely new mode of governance, 
this article shows that the innovative side of the new method was 
“simply” inspired by the open method of coordination (OMC). Fur-
thermore, this policy cannot be qualified as a unilateral one, as new 
procedures and rules have acted as constraints on the candidate as 
well as on the member states, i.e. on emission and reception of as-
sistance. Of course, candidate states had to introduce various re-
forms to prove that they comply to the accession criteria, but also 
member  states  administrations  had  to  adapt  to  the  new  EU-rules 
adopted to increase the coordination between European and national 
institutions. Therefore, Twinning especially paved way for commu-
nication in a milieu where the culture of secrecy is the rule, between 
EU civil servants, as well as between EU and candidate partners. In 
a way, it acted as a framework of institutional adaptation and mu-Tulmets: Introduction of OMC in EU' s Enlargement Policy  83 
tual socialisation for a variety of actors from the public and the pri-
vate sectors.  
 
Nevertheless, the article shows that Twinning did not reach some of 
its original aims. It was conceived as an instrument, which could 
allow for better consistency in EU’s policy and for the making of a 
European  administrative  space.  In  fact,  it contributed to increase 
competition  between  different  national  models,  without  creating 
harmonisation  between  older  member  states’  experiences.  In  this 
sense,  it  is  not  possible  to  speak  of  the  transfer  of  a  European 
“model” to the East. On the side of the accession states, one may 
observe that transfers of rules did not happen in a linear, but in a 
very differentiated way, depending on the strength of the rules to be 
taken; nor did these transfers happen on the basis of an organisa-
tional tabula rasa, as logics of path dependencies were constantly 
present.  In  fact,  the  interpretation  and  reformulation  of  the  pre-
sented national rules and experiences opened ways for ideational 
cross-fertilisation processes and institutional hybridisation between 
legacies of the past and West-European experiences.  
 
To conclude, the same critique developed for the OMC in EU inter-
nal policies could apply to its use in the enlargement policy: the 
method did not really harmonise member states’ external as well as 
candidate states’ policies. On the side of the accession countries, the 
use  of  the  OMC  in  external  cooperation  policies  may  therefore 
prove efficient only for partial institutional transfers related to the 
adoption of the acquis communautaire and for partial strengthening 
of organisational structures responsible for the implementation of 
the acquis. To sum up, it allows for mutual learning processes on 
ways to implement the acquis, but hardly generates ideal-type mod-
els on ways to do so. Furthermore, as EU conditionality does not 
clearly target civil society and projects mainly mobilise administra-
tive elites, this would explain the lack of Twinning projects focus-
ing on the development of public bodies responsible for communi-
cation with CEEC societies.  
 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to realise that the relative success of 
this  instrument,  from  the  Commission’s  and  the  member  states’ 
point of view, was a basis for its transposition into the “Neighbour-
hood policy”, i.e. into other EU programmes like TACIS, CARDS Tulmets: Introduction of OMC in EU' s Enlargement Policy  84 
and MEDA
26. In this sense, the 1997 reform of the Enlargement 
policy represented, for sure, a window of opportunity for the intro-
duction of new methods of governance, i.e. methods of public man-
agement into EU’s external relations.  
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1 – Annual Budget of the PHARE programme (1990-1998), 
Mio EUR 
 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
493  758,9  996,2  998,4  966,9  1 153,3  1 222,5  1 147,7  1 
153,9 
 
Source: European Commission (2000), The Phare Programme. Annual Report 
1998, (COM (2000) 183 final), Brussels, p. 21. 
 
 
Annex 2 – Examples of Twinning projects in Estonia and Hungary  
 
Environnement (general) 
EE01/IB-EN-01  Nature Conservation Accession: Establishment of the 
Natura 2000 network under the Habitats Directive in 
Estonia 
FIN 
HU98/IB-AG-
02 (a) 
Completed 
Planning capacity for structural and agri-environmental 
development schemes 
D 
                                                 
26 TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States). 
CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabili-
sation): Balkan countries. MEDA : Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. More de-
tails on this: Tulmets (2003). See also EC (2002d). Tulmets: Introduction of OMC in EU' s Enlargement Policy  85 
HU98/IB-EN-
03 
Completed 
Habitats Directive 
 
FIN, 
E 
HU00/IB-EN-
01 
Air Quality Network  
 
D, A 
 
Regional development 
EE98/IB-SPP-
01 
Completed 
Preparation for Structural Funds  IRL, 
F, 
FIN, 
D 
HU98/IB-SPP-
01/-02 
Completed 
Establishment  of  a  coherent  framework  for  regional 
development  /  Preparation  of  operation  of  pre-
accession aid (ISPA, SAPARD) 
F,  A, 
E, 
FIN, 
UK 
HU01/IB-SPP-
01 
Establishing  the  Managing  Authorities  for  Structural 
Funds 
 
UK, 
D, 
IRL 
 
Judiciary and court system 
EE98/IB-JH-01 
Completed 
Strengthening of the court system 
 
D 
HU01/IB-JH-02  Training of judges and prosecutors 
 
D, F 
 
Employment projects 
EE99/IB-CO-01 Institution  Building  for  the  Social  Acquis  (Labour 
Market and Social Security) 
DK 
EE00/IB-OT-02  Support to the Balanced Development of the Labour 
Market Services  
D, S 
 
Social security projects 
HU99/IB-CO-
01 
Social security of migrant workers 
 
NL, E 
HU01/IB-FI-01  Health financing  D Tulmets: Introduction of OMC in EU' s Enlargement Policy  86 
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